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Summary
Successful social interaction depends on not only the ability
to identify with others but also the ability to distinguish
between aspects of self and others [1–4]. Although there is
considerable knowledge of a shared neural substrate
between self-action and others’ action [5], it remains
unknown where and how in the brain the action of others
is uniquely represented. Exploring such agent-specific
neural codes is important because one’s action and inten-
tion can differ between individuals [1]. Moreover, the assign-
ment of social agency breaks down in a range of mental
disorders [6–8]. Here, using two monkeys monitoring each
other’s action for adaptive behavioral planning, we show
that the medial frontal cortex (MFC) contains a group of
neurons that selectively encode others’ action. These
neurons, observed in both dominant and submissive
monkeys, were significantly more prevalent in the dorsome-
dial convexity region of the MFC including the pre-supple-
mentary motor area than in the cingulate sulcus region of
the MFC including the rostral cingulate motor area. Further
tests revealed that the difference in neuronal activity was
not due to gaze direction or muscular activity. We suggest
that the MFC is involved in self-other differentiation in the
domain of motor action and provides a fundamental neural
signal for social learning.
Results and Discussion
Various fields of research demonstrate converging evidence
for the existence of a shared neural code between self-action
and others’ action at the level of single neurons. Specifically,
a class of neurons in various parts of the brain fire during
both the execution and observation of a particular motor act
[5, 9]. It has been argued that these ‘‘mirror neurons’’ provide
the basis for bridging the gap between the physical self and
others [10] and for understanding others’ action and intention
[5]. Although social neuroscience has progressed enormously
since the discovery of mirror neurons, the question of what
neural mechanism (or mechanisms) enables one to distinguish
others’ action from one’s own remains unanswered. This
distinction is of crucial importance for productive social*Correspondence: iriki@brain.riken.jp (A.I.), masaki.isoda@oist.jp (M.I.)exchanges. In social life, people must accurately assign
a shared outcome to one’s own actions or those of other
individuals to decide the optimal level of cooperation and
reciprocity [3]. Because mirror neurons do not specify which
social agent is acting, such self-other differentiation requires
separate neural mechanisms.
Studies in this research direction have typically used
behavioral tasks where subjects passively view the action of
other individuals. We reasoned, however, that to investigate
a neural code selective for the action of another agent, we
needed to devise an experimental paradigm in which subjects
actively utilize others’ action information for guiding their own
behavior. Here, we sought to do this by developing a role-
reversal task for monkeys (Figure 1A).
In this task, two monkeys sat face to face and took turns
making a choice for a reward. In each trial, one monkey was
assigned the role of the actor and the other monkey the role
of the observer. After the actor had pressed his start button
for 1–1.5 s (Figure 1A, ‘‘Stay’’), two target buttons were illumi-
nated in yellow and green (Figure 1A, ‘‘Target’’). The positions
of the yellow and green targets were randomly exchanged
from trial to trial. The actor was required to choose one of
them to obtain a reward (Figure 1A, ‘‘Choice’’), while the
observer was trained to press his start button throughout
the trial. In each trial, only one of the two target colors was
associated with reward. The reward-associated color (for
example, green) remained unchanged during a block of 5–17
trials (Figure 1B), after which the color-reward contingency
reversed unpredictably, requiring a switch to choose the alter-
nate color (for example, yellow). The actor’s correct choice
yielded a liquid reward (a drop of water) to both monkeys,
whereas neither monkey was rewarded if the actor made a
wrong choice (Figure 1A, ‘‘Outcome’’). The roles of the actor
and observer alternated every two trials (Figure 1B), giving
the two animals an equal opportunity for motor execution.
We first tested whether our monkeys, N and S, could make
use of the partner’s action information for guiding their own
response choices. The analysis of choice behavior in the
face of no reward revealed that this was indeed the case.
Specifically, when a reward was absent because the partner
had erroneously chosen a previously nonrewarded color while
the block remained unchanged (‘‘type 1 no reward’’), the
monkeys did not switch the color-reward contingency in the
next trial when they became the actor (Figure 1C; see Fig-
ure S1A available online for additional explanation). However,
when the partner had chosen a previously reward-associated
color but the expected reward no longer followed owing to a
block change (‘‘type 2 no reward’’), themonkeys now promptly
switched to the alternate color in the next trial (Figure 1D; see
Figure S1B for additional explanation). Because the trial
outcome per se did not instruct the monkeys about the
upcoming choice (i.e., the absence of a reward in both cases
above), these observations indicate that the monkeys tracked
and utilized their partner’s action information in deciding
whether or not to switch the color-reward contingency.
While the animals performed the role-reversal task, we
monitored the activity of 862 single neurons in the medial
frontal cortex (MFC) [11–14]. We targeted this brain region
Figure 1. Behavioral Task and Animals’ Choice Behavior
(A) Temporal sequence of events in role-reversal task. Shown is an example
of a single trial in which monkey S was the actor and monkey N was the
observer. The reward outcome differed depending on the color-reward
contingency (‘‘Outcome’’).
(B) In the task, two monkeys alternated in the role of the actor every two
trials, and the color-reward contingency switched unpredictably every
5–17 trials (blocked design). ‘‘Green block’’ means that the green target
was associated with a reward. N and S indicate the acting monkey.
(C) Percent correct choice in trials immediately after partner’s type 1 no
reward. Error bars indicate standard error of themean (SEM). SeeFigure S1A
for further explanation.
(D) Percent correct choice in trials immediately after partner’s type 2 no
reward. Error bars indicate SEM. See Figure S1B for further explanation.
(E) Gaze directions of monkey N (near side) during action period. The start
buttons are depicted as open gray circles and the target buttons as filled
gray circles. These color codes are for illustrative purposes only; during
actual experiments, the target buttons were illuminated in green and yellow.
Red dots indicate gaze directions whenmonkey N reached for his left target
(as actor), whereas dark blue dots indicate gaze directions when monkey N
reached for his right target. Light blue dots indicate gaze directions of
monkey N (as observer) when his partner reached for the left target (viewed
from monkey N), whereas black dots indicate gaze directions when his
partner reached for the right target (viewed from monkey N).
Figure 2. Firing Property of Partner-Type Neurons and Their Spatial Distri-
bution in Medial Frontal Cortex
(A) Raster displays and spike density functions illustrating activity of a single
partner-type neuron. Smaller dots represent the time of individual action
potentials, and larger dots indicate the time of target onset. The displays
are aligned on the onset of target button press (vertical lines and gray
triangles).
(B) Spike density functions for population of partner-type neurons (mean 6
SEM).
(C) Recording sites of partner-type neurons (left hemispheres). Neurons in
the medial frontal cortex (MFC) convexity are depicted in blue, and those
in the MFC sulcus are depicted in red (see inset). The size of the circles is
proportional to the number of neurons at each site. Horizontal arrows indi-
cate the physiologically defined border between the supplementary motor
area (SMA) and pre-SMA. Black triangles represent the cortical midline.
The inset above shows the top view of the left frontal lobe (left) and a coronal
section (right) at the rostrocaudal level indicated by a broken line. CgS
indicates cingulate sulcus.
Table 1. Number of Agent-Related Neurons in Each Subregion of MFC
Partner
Type
Self
Type
Mirror
Type
Total Neurons
Recorded
Monkey N
MFC convexity 74 (70) 23 (23) 25 (19) 322
MFC sulcus 27 (27) 37 (36) 9 (7) 279
Monkey S
MFC convexity 26 (25) 21 (21) 15 (8) 138
MFC sulcus 11 (11) 19 (19) 11 (11) 123
Total 138 (133) 100 (99) 60 (45) 862
Values denote the numbers of neurons. Values in parentheses denote the
numbers of neurons after correction using the false discovery rate.
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250because it has been increasingly recognized as important for
social cognition [15]. Our most striking finding, and therefore
the main focus of this study, was the existence of neurons
that were selectively activated during the partner’s action.
The activity of a single MFC neuron (Figure 2A) and the popu-
lation of these neurons (Figure 2B) significantly increased
when the partner performed the action, whereas the activity re-
mained unchanged during the action of one’s own. This type of
neuron—‘‘partner type’’—accounted for as many as 46% (n =
138) of all agent-related neurons (Table 1), which were defined
by the activity in the action period (200–0 ms before the onset
of target button press; see Supplemental Experimental Proce-
dures). Among these partner-type neurons, 45 neurons (33%)
were selective for the target position, whereas 5 neurons (4%)
were selective for the target color (Table S1). Other types of
agent-related neuron we found in the MFC displayed a selec-
tive increase in activity during self-action (self type, n = 100;
Figure S2) or nondifferential activation between self-action
and the partner’s action (mirror type, n = 60; Figure S3).
We next compared the proportion of partner-type neurons
between two subregions of the MFC, i.e., the dorsomedialconvexity region (‘‘MFC convexity’’; Figure 2C, blue), which
mainly includes the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA)
and its rostrally adjacent region, and the cingulate sulcus
region (‘‘MFC sulcus’’; Figure 2C, red), which mainly includes
the rostral cingulate motor area. Although both regions con-
tained partner-type neurons, their proportion was significantly
Figure 3. Lack of Electromyographic Activity Modulation during Observa-
tion of Partner’s Action
Rectified electromyographic activities in the anterior deltoid, pectoralis
major, biceps brachii, triceps brachii, upper trapezius, and latissimus dorsi
muscles on the right side ofmonkey N. The displays are aligned on the onset
of target button press (vertical lines and gray triangles).
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251larger in the MFC convexity than in the MFC sulcus (p < 1026,
chi-square test). The predominance of partner-type neurons in
the MFC convexity was consistent for both monkeys (monkey
N, p < 1024; monkey S, p = 0.022) (Table 1). This was in marked
contrast to self-type neurons, which were significantly more
prevalent in the MFC sulcus (p = 0.046). The time courses of
partner-selective neuronal activity were similar between the
MFC convexity and the MFC sulcus (Figure S4).
We then tested the possibility using a food-grab task [16]
that partner-selective neuronal activity might reflect animals’
social hierarchy (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
The behavioral analysis revealed that monkey N was dominant
and monkey S was submissive (p = 0.031, Wilcoxon signed-
rank test). However, the proportion of partner-type neurons
was not significantly different between the two monkeys (p >
0.3, chi-square test), suggesting that the activity of partner-
type neurons was not a representation of hierarchical relation-
ships. We also tested whether the activity of partner-type
neurons was modulated by the correctness of the partner’s
action. A comparison of neuronal activity between the part-
ner’s correct trials and erroneous trials revealed that 40% of
the partner-type neurons tested showed differential activity
depending on the correctness of partner’s choices. This sug-
gests that these partner-type neurons are involved in more
cognitive aspects of others’ performance, such as the value
of the partner’s actions.
Subsequently, we examined the effects of potential con-
founding factors on neuronal activity. First, we determined
whether the difference in the activity of partner-type neurons
resulted from differences in eye position between self-action
and the partner’s action (Figure 1E). An analysis of covariance,
which dissociates the effect of the agent from that of gaze
parameters (Supplemental Experimental Procedures), re-
vealed that at least w70% of the partner-type neurons were
still significantly selective for the agent of action (Table S2).
We next analyzed the electromyographic (EMG) activity in
several forelimb and axial muscles to rule out the possibility
that covert movement occurred exclusively during the obser-
vation of the partner’s action. We confirmed that in contrast
to a phasic change in neuronal activity, the EMG activity
showed a lack of modulation during the partner’s action (Fig-
ure 3). These findings suggest that peripheral motor factors
cannot explain the property of partner-selective neuronal
activity.
This study revealed a novel class of neurons in the monkey
MFC that are selectively activated during the partner’s action.
How can this activity be interpreted? First, the activity of these
neurons cannot be explained by reward expectation, because
a reward was expected by both self-action and the partner’s
action. Second, the difference in their activity is not due to
viewing of the acting hand. As shown in Figure 1E, the
monkeys observed both self-action and the partner’s action
when performing the task as the actor and observer, respec-
tively. That is, the ‘‘action observation’’ condition was not
confined to the observer monkey. Although one can argue
that the monkeys might have directed their covert attention
to their partner evenwhen executing their own action, a double
dissociation of neuronal types between the two subregions of
the MFC (Table 1) does not support this possibility. Third, the
lack of muscle activity during the partner’s action raises the
possibility that the neuronal activity inhibits one’s own action.
Several studies have shown that the MFC, particularly the pre-
SMA, is involved in motor response inhibition [17–19]. If this
interpretation is correct, then one would expect that theneuronal activity should decrease when making a self-
generated movement in order to release it from inhibition
(i.e., disinhibition). In recent reports, a similar logic has been
used to discuss a functional role of a particular type of mirror
neurons in the monkey premotor cortex [20] and human MFC
[9]. Contrary to what one might expect, however, we found
that only a minority of partner-type neurons (19%; n = 26)
showed significantly decreased activity during the self-action
(Figure S5). This finding does not immediately support the
response-inhibition hypothesis, at least for most of the
partner-type neurons. On the other hand, it is important to
determine whether and how the inhibitory function underlies
the ability to distinguish others from self. As Decety and Som-
merville haveargued, executive inhibitionmight beanecessary
requisite to suppress the prepotent self-perspective in favor of
others’ perspective [1]. Developmental research has shown
that inhibitory control is a crucial enabling factor for the devel-
opment and expression of the theory of mind [21].
Taking these findings together, we propose that the partner-
selective activity in the MFC represents higher-order, agent-
related information. In support of this interpretation, the
MFC, particularly the pre-SMA, receives preferential projec-
tions from the dorsal bank and fundus of the anterior portion
of the superior temporal sulcus (aSTS) [22], which appears to
correspond to the superior temporal polysensory area (STP)
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252[23]. Interestingly, neurons in the STP do not respond to tactile
stimulation arising from the monkey’s active exploration of
a familiar surface, including his own body, but they respond
to passive stimulation, for example from the touch of the
experimenter [24]. Moreover, STP neurons, despite being in
the minority (w5%), respond vigorously to stimulus motion
presented by the experimenter, whereas they do not respond
to the sight of the animal’s own limb movement [25]. These
findings point to the importance of a neuronal network
involving the temporal andmedial frontal cortices in represent-
ing aspects of other agents. Recent studies have emphasized
the roles of the STS and MFC in processing social information,
which culminates in the perception of the dispositions and
intentions of other individuals [15, 26].
There are at least two important theoretical implications of
our findings. First, the MFC can provide a neural substrate
that enables a self-other differentiation in the domain of motor
action. A currently proposed theory is that the mirror neuron
system is involved in understanding others’ action [5]. How-
ever, with this system alone, one cannot make a clear-cut
distinction between self-action and others’ action, because
their neural codes closely overlap. A motor act that an
observer is seeing but not performing must be correctly as-
signed as the action of another agent. Such agent-specific
mechanisms are thought to be a requisite for mentalizing
ability and productive social exchanges [27]. In this regard, it
should be noted that among the partner-type neurons, one-
third were selective for the target position, whereas the
remaining neurons were not (Table S1). An interesting hypoth-
esis is that such position-nonselective partner-type neurons
encode ‘‘the partner is acting,’’ whereas position-selective
partner-type neurons encode ‘‘what the partner is doing.’’
Second, in complex social environments, the behavior of
others provides a rich supply of fictive information, such as
fictive outcomes (rewards or punishments not directly experi-
enced but observed) and fictive actions (actions not directly
taken but observed). The action taken by another individual
can be considered a form of fictive action. Importantly, hu-
mans and other animals have the capability of learning from
fictive information [28], such as learning from others and
learning about others. The MFC contains neurons encoding
fictive rewards [29]. Our findings suggest that the MFC addi-
tionally encodes fictive actions and plays a critical role in social
learning [15, 30]. The computational implementation of such
fictive signals in social learning andmentalizing is an important
topic for future research [31].
The MFC has been implicated in self-monitoring of behavior
and attention to self-action [32–36]. More recent reports have
emphasized the role for this region in processing social infor-
mation [30, 37]. Our present results add an important new
dimension to these findings by demonstrating that a group
of medial frontal neurons selectively encode the action of
others. We have obtained the present findings by devising
a task in which two monkeys were monitoring each other’s
action for adaptive motor decisions. Notably, the monkeys
tracked their partner’s choice and reward outcomes, thereby
guiding their own optimal behavior. Humans and other animals
actively pay attention to other individuals to acquire valuable
social information [38]. This ability is of crucial importance
for the survival of animals, because even one slip of attention
to others could result in a fatal outcome in a dangerous situa-
tion. Our newparadigm offers a unique experimental approach
to illuminate the neuronal basis of socially oriented behavior in
the laboratory.Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes five figures, two tables, Supplemental
Discussion, and Supplemental Experimental Procedures and can be found
with this article online at doi:10.1016/j.cub.2011.01.004.
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